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Abstract. The extended rank-discounted utilitarian social welfare order introduced
and axiomatized by St ephane Zuber and Geir B. Asheim satises strong anonymity (J.
Econ. Theory (2011), doi:10.1016/j.jet.2011.08.001). We question the appropriateness
of strong anonymity in the context of a countably innite sequence of subsequent
generations. A modied criterion that is incomplete and satises nite anonymity is
presented.
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1 The extended rank-discounted utilitarian social welfare order
Zuber and Asheim study a countably innite sequence of subsequent generations
and consider the collection X of all bounded innite streams. For each x in
X a related non-decreasing stream x[] = (x[1];x[2];:::;x[t];:::) is dened. Let
`(x) denote liminft!+1 xt and consider the restriction y of x to L(x) = ft in
N : xt < `(x)g. If y is an innite subsequence of x, then x[] rewrites y in non-
decreasing order. If y = (y1;y2;:::;yn) is a nite vector, then x[] rewrites the
sequence (y1;y2;:::;yn;`(x);`(x);:::;`(x);:::) in non-decreasing order.
An extended rank-discounted utilitarian social welfare order [1, Denition 2]
is represented by a social welfare function W : X ! R dened by









with 0 <  < 1 and u a continuous and increasing real valued function. The
length of the discounted sum in W(x) either is nite (if jL(x)j < +1) or innite
(if jL(x)j = +1).
11.1 Strong anonymity
The welfare order represented by W satises strong anonymity [1, Theorem 1].
Hence, for each stream x in X and for each permutation  on N, the stream x
and its permuted stream x = (x(1);x(2);:::;x(t);:::) are equally good.
Let us illustrate this axiom. Consider y = (1=2;2=3;:::;t=(t+1);:::) and let
z = 1000000. Dene innite streams a and b as follows:
a10k = yk for each k in N and at = z elsewhere;
and b is equal to y except that for each k in N at position 10k the value b10k = z
is inserted in between two subsequent coordinates of y. The streams a and b
both accommodate the innite streams y and (z;z;:::;z;:::). Therefore, there
exists a permutation  on N such that a = b. Also, liminf a = liminf b = 1
and a[] = b[] = y. Hence, according to W the streams a and b are equally good.
Now, change b into b0 by changing b3 = 3=4 into b0
3 = 3=4 + 0:01. The extended




1=2; 2=3; 0:76; 4=5; :::; 9=10; z; 10=11; :::; 98=99; z; 99=100; :::

;
as strictly better than b and, therefore, strictly better than a.
The set f10;102;103;:::;10k;:::g has an asymptotic density (see below) equal
to limk!+1 k=10k = 0. In this language, the consumption stream a allocates to
almost each generation the high level z. In contrast, the consumption stream b
allocates to almost each generation the low level 1. Nevertheless, the extended
rank-discounted \utilitarian" rule is unable to see the dierence and considers a
and b as equally good. In addition, according to this criterion stream b0 should
be strictly preferred to a. I believe the indierence between the consumption
streams a and b, and the ranking of stream b0 over a is hard to defend.
2 Anonymity
Anonymity in a nite context is easy to understand and to model. Consider
a population N = f1;2;:::;ng. A welfare order on Rn is anonymous if for
each permutation  : N ! N and for each vector a in Rn we have indierence
between a and a. A permutation only reshues the positions of the coordinates
in a vector and has no eect upon the anonymous ranking. In addition, the
counting measure (on a nite set) is invariant under each permutation: a subset
S of individuals and a permuted set (S) have exactly the same weight, that is
the relative numbers jSj=jNj and j(S)j=jNj coincide. In sum, anonymity entails
equal treatment of individuals and equal treatment of equally large groups of
individuals.
In the framework of subsequent generations the weight of a subset S is indi-






1If jS \ f1;2;:::;tgj=t does not converge, the asymptotic density (S) is not dened.
2For example, sets of the form fn;2n;:::;kn;:::g have asymptotic density equal
to 1=n. If anonymity is supposed to guarantee equal treatment of generations
and of groups of generations, then the set of permutations used to operationalize
this idea should be restricted to the set of density-preserving permutations. A
nite permutation  on N satises (t) = t for all but a nite set of numbers
t in N and preserves asymptotic densities. On the other hand, the previous
section presented an innite permutation that transforms a set of generations
with density 0 into a set with density 1. Obviously, that kind of permutations
do not preserve asymptotic densities. As illustrated, a social welfare order that
satises strong anonymity is unable to take the weights of subsets into account.
We now argue that the frameworks of subsequent generations and of an in-
nite set of individuals are dierent and that asymptotic densities are relevant in
the former framework. In case one considers an (unordered) set of individuals,
the asymptotic density is not relevant. The countably innite sets
f1;2;:::;n;:::g and f1;2;4;3;6;8;:::;2n   1;4n   2;4n;:::g
should be considered as being the same. Each list presents the very same set of
individuals. The queuing, however, is dierent.
In contrast, the countably innite vectors
(1;2;:::;n;:::) and (1;2;4;3;6;8;:::;2n   1;4n   2;4n;:::)
should be considered as being dierent. The asymptotic density of the set of
odd numbers is equal to 1=2 in the rst and 1=3 in the second vector. The
permutation that maps the rst enumeration into the second one, again, does
not preserve the asymptotic densities. As soon the set is ordered, e.g. if one
considers moments in time (with an innite future), then the asymptotic density
becomes relevant. For example, a situation in which a particular event occurs
once in each week diers from a situation in which the same event occurs once in
each year (although in both situations the event happens innitely many times).
2.1 A modied criterion
Consider an innite number of subsequent generations. Let x be a bounded in-
nite stream with only a nite number of cluster points (or accumulation points).
For each cluster point c consider the set
C = ftjc   "  xt  c + "g;
with " > 0 such that the interval [c "; c+"] contains exactly one cluster point
(to wit, the cluster point c). If the asymptotic density (C) is well dened, then
(c) = (C) is said to be the weight of the cluster point c. Note that (c) does
not depend upon the particular value of ". Let Y collect those innite streams
that have a nite number of cluster points and for which the cluster points have
well dened weights.
3The stream a in the previous section has two cluster points 1 and z with
weights 0 and 1, the stream b has the same cluster points 1 and z with weights
1 and 0.
We now dene a modied criterion. A stream x in Y can be evaluated on the
basis of its cluster points and their weights, e.g.
V (x) = uk(c1;c2;:::;ck ; (c1);(c2);:::;(ck));
with c1 < c2 <  < ck the nite number of dierent cluster points in x and with
uk a continuous real valued function (dened for each natural number k).2 In
case V is indierent between two streams x and y, some strong Pareto criterion
might be used for further investigation.
Let us apply this modied criterion V to the stream y = (x1;x2;:::;xn)rep,
i.e. the innite repetition of the nite vector (x1;x2;:::;xn). Each xi is a cluster
point of y with weight 1=n (assume that the xi are all dierent). We obtain
V (y) = un(x1;x2;:::;xn ; 1=n;1=n;:::;1=n):
In contrast, according to the extended rank-discounted utilitarian social welfare
function, we obtain
W(y) = u(minfx1;x2;:::;xng):
The eect of strong anonymity is again revealed. The extended rank-discounted
utilitarian social welfare order only takes one cluster point into account (while
V considers each cluster point as relevant).
This note questions the appropriateness of the extended rank-discounted util-
itarian social welfare order introduced and characterized by Zuber and Asheim.
Nevertheless, I want to stress that this welfare order, when restricted to the set
of non-decreasing streams does not suer from the strong anonymity problem
and contributes to the ongoing debate on intertemporal welfare.
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